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Abstract
Advanced driver assistance systems are advancing at a rapid pace and all major companies started investing in de-
veloping the autonomous vehicles. But the security and reliability is still uncertain and debatable. Imagine that a
vehicle is compromised by the attackers and then what they can do. An attacker can control brake, accelerate and
even steering which can lead to catastrophic consequences. This paper gives a very short and brief overview of most
of the possible attacks on autonomous vehicle software and hardware and their potential implications.
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1. Introduction
Digital technologies are improvising at a rapid speed
and moving towards automation by including artificial
intelligence. Similarly Automakers also started focus-
ing on connected Autonomous vehicles. These vehicles
help to improve the safety of passengers and increase
the efficiency of transportation by interacting with the
external world through V2X and V2V communications.
By sharing data like speed, position, and heading angle
help to predict the succeeding location of the vehicle.
Using Sensor technologies, maneuvering of roads and
terrains becoming easier and with the help of predeter-
mined knowledge[1].
As the percentage of automation increases the human
interaction with the vehicle increases and passengers
will become the audience. This may also lead to many
potential cyber threats and attacks like Hacking ECU’s,
GPS spoofing, Modified traffic signs, Injecting false bits
in the CAN and altering sensor values. This paper very
briefly discuss about the vulnerabilities, security issues,
exploitative methods and the adverse effect of them on
the connected autonomous vehicles[2].
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1.1. Why are autonomous vehicles more vulnerable to
attacks?
Compared to conventional vehicle autonomous vehi-
cle has to communicate with other vehicles and infras-
tructure which are external networks and may become
a channel for attack and an opportunity for hackers[3].
For autonomous vehicles, vast information has to be
processed particularly deep learning algorithms are used
in processing image related data which are prone to ad-
versarial attacks and the probability of false positives
increases with increase in the amount of data to be pro-
cessed. As the technology is in the nascent stage in both
hardware and software and not yet rigorously tested be-
cause of which it is difficult to make it reliable in all
conditions and also autonomous vehicles are prone to
bugs and vulnerabilities also which can be exploited by
the attackers[4].
2. Attacks exploiting the vulnerabilities in various
sensors of vehicle
2.1. Global Positioning System (GPS)
To locate and navigate the vehicle, one uses GPS data
with great accuracy. To overcome the difficulties in get-
ting GPS data, the count of satellites increased in the
public domain where one can easily access the data. The
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Figure 1: Possible attacks on autonomous vehicles
provision of free access to the data with transparent ar-
chitecture helping the hackers to mislead or manipulate
the data to provide the wrong directions or to control
the routing of the vehicle[5]. This lead to the security
and safety issues of the passengers. Misleading of the
GPS signals is known as GPS spoofing and jamming
where hackers transmit the unrealistic signal/data. The
strength of the unrealistic signal increases as the GPS
receivers are programmed to receive the stronger sig-
nals and gradually the position of the vehicle is modified
from the desired target[6].
2.2. Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
IMU is the combination of the Gyroscope and Ac-
celerometers which provides the data of velocity, accel-
eration, and orientation of the vehicle. They also mon-
itor the change in the environmental dynamics like the
gradient. The data provided by the sensors can be mod-
ified or not to recognize the gradient of the road. It
causes the vehicle to moves slow on the gradient roads
which intern slow down the following vehicles[6].
2.3. Light Detection and Ranging (Lidar)
Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) is used to lo-
calize the environment, obstacle detection, and avoid-
ance. It based on the technology, time taken by the light
to travel to and fro to the vehicle determine’s the dis-
tance at which the object is located. If the hacker sends
a signal of the same frequency to the scanner and to as-
sume the object is detected. It makes the Autonomous
vehicle to move slowly or stop[6].
2.4. Monoscopic and Stereoscopic Cameras
Cameras are used to detect lane detection, traffic sign
recognition, headlight detection, obstacle detection, etc.
Functioning of cameras can be partially disabled by us-
ing high beam torches or headlights of the opposite ve-
hicles. It may introduce the safety concerns like false
detection or not detection of the objects. Complemen-
tary metal oxide(CMOS) sensors used in the camera can
be blinded by the high-power lights[6].
3. Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) attacks
3.1. Attacks on Internal Networks
3.1.1. Passcode and Key attacks
passcode and keys are one of the safety features of the
connected cars. Multiple attempts may crack the pass-
word or keys which works on the IR based technologies
can be easily hacked. Brute force attack on the passcode
can crack the passcodes of the connected cars. Blue-
tooth connectivity can be affected and leaks the private
data of the passenger.
3.2. Attacks on External Networks
3.2.1. V2X Network Attacks
Connecting car concept and emerging technologies in
vehicular networks and which can communicate with
other cars and infrastructure giving many advantages
along with opening up the network and providing the
network access point for the attackers to exploit[7]. It
can connect to a smartphone,cloud and other devices
and communicate which is described as the V2X com-
munication.
Generally communicating channel between the car
and smartphone is established through Wifi, Bluetooth
and GSM protocols which are inherently vulnerable and
contain known bugs and vulnerabilities which can be
exploited by the attackers. Connecting to a smartphone
is always a risk for a vehicle as it is interacting with
an external unfamiliar device. Sending and receiving
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data from the cloud is a threat as the data centre may
get compromised and then vehicle starts communicat-
ing with the miscellaneous server.
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) pro-
tocol in V2V networks is a duplex communication pro-
tocol channel used particularly for automotive use oper-
ating at 5.9 GHz with a bandwidth of 75 Mhz, WAVE
(Wireless Access in vehicular environments) and IEEE
802.11 p are the protocols that are generally used in the
V2X communication. All of them have known vulnera-
bilities which can be exploited by an attacker.
Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) Network Attacks: The
Communication between the host vehicle and adjacent
vehicles for overtaking, lane changing, at intersection
cars, exchange data through V2V networks. Imperson-
ation attack consists of a malicious car which connects
with the host vehicle with a false identification by spoof-
ing then it establishes communication sending the ma-
licious and receiving the sensitive data capturing it than
logging and storing it[8].
The major drawback of V2V communication is the
use of insecure and unencrypted protocols which makes
attackers to eavesdropping the traffic and data between
the host vehicle and other vehicle communication and
then get the sensitive information like authentication
keys leading to authentication attacks
Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) Network Attacks: The
vehicle connects with the infrastructure establishing a
communication channel for receiving and transmitting
information. The vehicle connects with intelligent traf-
fic signs and cellular network nodes which can be com-
promised, infected and impersonated by an attacker thus
gaining a access through a backdoor intruding into the
vehicle network and ECU’s.
3.3. Distrubuted Denial Of Services (DDOS)
Denial of service is one of the most vulnerable threats
that connected cars may experience. service of the sys-
tem denied by the several attacking mechanisms which
results in disruption of the traffic flow and damages to
the infrastructure. It may cause the collision of the ve-
hicles, a life threat for the passengers.
4. Hardware attacks and exploits
4.1. OBD port based attack
OBD stands for onboard diagnostics and OBD port
is present in almost all the vehicles manufactured from
2008[9]. OBD port is used for collecting the diagnos-
tics data of the vehicle. It gives the data about the vehi-
cle faults and performance. It interacts with the ECU’s
communicating through CAN bus. It is a hand held de-
vice like USB which has to be connected to the vehi-
cle through the port generally present below the dash-
board opposite to adjacent driver seat. which then con-
nects to the computer through a wired connection us-
ing USB port or through a wireless connection using
Bluetooth[10]. once connected PC can send and re-
ceive the data to and from the vehicle ECU’s and with
a possible exploitation can also manipulate the data
packets and inject malicious packets into the vehicle
network[11].
4.2. ECU Firmware tampering attack
ECU (Engine control unit) is a electronic control
module for the sensors and actuators of any sub-system
in a vehicle and a typical vehicle consists of more than
100 ECU’s[12]. ECU code is propitiatory making it safe
and secure but attackers started targeting recent attacks
by re flashing the ECU with custom firmware altering
its state and inducing malicious and unintended actions.
It is called a direct access attack as we assume that at-
tacker has physical access to the ECU.Attacker updates
the firmware of ECU using the external interface thus
altering the functionality of ECU.By altering the ECU
memory and tampering the security keys and maintain-
ing the integrity of the ECU firmware code and its up-
dates using the hashing techniques and authentication
for software updating[12].
4.3. Rogue updates
Firmware updates in the connected cars are one of
the sources for the Rogue updates. These updates are
not from the manufacturer and lack of proper updates
with safety and security. they are prone to the severe
cyber attacks which leak private data of the vehicle. It
allows hackers to provide enough security weakness to
introduce malware and control the firmware of the con-
nected cars.
The exploitation can be through 1) Physical Access
2) Remote Access
4.3.1. Physical Access
Nowadays physical layer is integrated with the ECU’s
directly which increases the potential for cyber attacks.
Hackers can directly exploit the sensor data, control and
communication modules. The attacks can be direct or
indirect attacks targeting vehicular electronic modules
or overloading effect on the physical layer.
4.3.2. Remote Access
Remote Access can be done through different con-
nections like WiFi, Bluetooth, 4G, etc. ECU’s are di-
rectly connected to the CAN bus which is not intended.
3
Connectivity to internet leads to the potential threat of
injecting malware or virus files into the firmware. Au-
tomakers are not sure about the threats or actions to be
taken to eradicate them. Even Automakers are not sure
of the recovery actions to be performed.
5. Adversarial Attacks on Autonomous vehicles
Deep Learning is based on the probabilistic estima-
tion for the classification tasks predicting the data be-
longing to a particular class with a certain level of prob-
ability and when the probability is higher then we say
that class has higher confidence[13].
Deep learning algorithms like Deep Neural Net-
works (DNN’s) are start of the art techniques that are
used in the autonomous vehicles for perception and
sensing[14]. But DNN’s are prone to certain adver-
sarial attacks making the autonomous vehicles vulner-
able to such attacks.Adversarial attack is a form of
attack in which the small noise or perturbations are
added to the original data misleading and deceiving the
DNN’s decision making which may create dangerous
consequences[15].
In [16] physical perturbations are created by adding
stickers to a stop traffic sign at certain positions and the
traffic sign detection algorithm failed to classify it cor-
rectly.
6. Miscellaneous Attacks
Numerous attacks were getting implemented by
many researchers and hackers.Gaining access to key
less entry system by spoofing,Malware attacks and ap-
plications that installed in the infotainment and naviga-
tion systems. New types of attacks like attacking the
electric vehicle by exploiting the electric charger which
is connecting and logging the data.
Because of the diversity in the automobiles like com-
bustion engine cars,hybrid cars,plug in hybrid and com-
plete electric cars along with the autonomous vehicle
capabilities it is difficult to maintains the overall se-
curity and presence of different OEM’s(original equip-
ment manufacturer) and tier 1 manufacturers which
makes a very complex supply chain for the automobiles
thus creating the scope for many miscellaneous vulner-
abilities and exploitation’s.
7. Conclusion
This paper aims to cover most of the common cyber
attacks and exploits that are possible on a autonomous
connected vehicle. This is most dynamic area and the
attacks are getting sophisticated day by day and attack-
ers are always finding new ways and tools to deceive and
hack the vehicle. As the autonomous vehicle develop-
ment is growing with rapid pace but the security aspect
of vehicle is not receiving deserved attention which may
become a serious threat to autonomous vehicles security
and adoption as many countries are trying to bring au-
tonomous vehicles on road soon. Researchers have to
come forward to join hands for collaborating and proac-
tively giving priority to cyber security at design and de-
velopment stages.
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